For carbon-intensive, internationally-traded industrial goods, a unilateral increase in the domestic CO 2 price may result in the reduction of the domestic production but an increase of imports. In such sectors as electricity, cement or steel, the trade ows result more from shortterm regional disequilibria between supply and demand than from international competition. This paper formalizes this empirical observation and characterizes its impact on leakage. Domestic rms invest in home plants under uncertainty; then, as uncertainty unfolds, they may source the home market from their home plants or from imports. We prove that there would be no leakage in the short-term (without capacity adaptation) but there would be in the long-term (with capacity adaption). Furthermore, the larger the uncertainty the larger the leakage is. We also characterize the impacts of uncertainty on the (short-term and long-term) pass-through rates. In the concluding section we briey discuss the implications of these results for the evaluation of climate policies.
Introduction
When a country A implements a unilateral climate policy carbon leakage refers to the fact that the reduction of emissions in country A may be partly oset by the increase of emissions in the rest of the world.
The literature on carbon leakage has been initiated by Rutherford (1992) and Felder and Rutherford (1993) who coined the term leakage. Carbon leakage plays a major role in the evaluation and design of alternative climate policies (Droege and Cooper, 2009; Hood, 2010) . The empirical importance of the issue has generated a large number of models which evaluate the ex ante consequences of unilateral climate policies and the relative merits of remedies.
Several channels through which leakage could arise have been identied.
The two most scrutinized channels are: the energy-market and the termsof-trade channels. This paper focuses on the terms-of-trade channel, also related to the competitiveness issue (i.e. that a unilateral climate policy may reduce national production and encourage imports). Most analyses are made in a deterministic framework so that capacity and production decisions are not distinguished and the inuence of demand uctuations is not considered.
In some trade-exposed and energy intensive sectors capacity decisions are governed by long term anticipated national supply and demand conditions.
1
Capacity shortages in one region may trigger imports from regions which have excess capacities. For instance the short term capacity constraints observed in Europe around [2005] [2006] [2007] explain better the trade patterns for cement and steel than the pressure of international competition between the EU and some specic non EU countries (Hourcade et al., 2008) . So far the consequences of this form of trade on carbon leakage have not been recognized. Our objective is to formalize this empirical observation and characterize its impacts on carbon leakage.
We use a partial equilibrium model for a sector consisting of multinationals. All rms provide the same good to the home market using capacity in home or in foreign (i.e. the rest of the world where capacity is innitely large). The cost structure is such that under certainty it would always be 1 Trade-exposed and energy intensive sectors are also denominated as sensitive sectors.
A sector is sensitive under two conditions: (Grubb and Neuho, 2006 ) the impact of the CO 2 price is high relative to its value added (value at stake), it is highly exposed to international trade (import intensity). If both conditions are satised sectoral leakage is high. Typical sensitive sectors are: cement, steel, basic chemicals, aluminum...
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preferable to deliver to the home market via home location rather than via a foreign location: imports take place only if capacity at home is binding.
Firms rst decide on their capacity at home based on an uncertain future home demand. Then the demand is known and rms compete à la Cournot under capacity constraints at home. The analysis is carried on assuming linearity in the long run average cost function (investment and production) and in the demand function. Import costs are also assumed to be linear. The demand function includes an additive random parameter uniformly distributed over a given range, the larger the range, the larger the demand variability.
We assume a constant CO 2 emission factor for home and foreign production.
We distinguish between short term and long term eects. Suppose home unilaterally adopts a more stringent climate policy (i.e. increases the price for CO 2 emissions); in the short term the capacities are given, in the long term the capacities are adapted to the change in the CO 2 price. With no uncertainty, an increase in the CO 2 price would lead to a decrease in the level of capacity and home production, but it would not induce relocation.
With an uncertain demand, we show that the reduction of home production is amplied and some relocation occurs. The short term leakage rate is null while the long term leakage rate is positive and increasing with the level of demand uncertainty. Our model allows for the analysis of demand uncertainty on the pass through rate, i.e. the ratio of the increase in the product price relative to the increase of the carbon cost. It will be shown that the short term pass through rate is lower than the long term one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The relation with the literature is discussed in Section 2. The model is described in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4. The concluding section discusses applications and some direction for theoretic extensions.
Related literature
There is a consequent literature on carbon leakage. This literature identies several channels through which leakage could arise, evaluates the consequences of unilateral climate policies and the relative merits of remedies.
The bulk of the literature consist in numerical simulations of policies with multi-countries multi-sectors general equilibrium models. The two most scrutinized channels for leakage are: the energy-market and the terms-of-trade channels.
3 The reduction of the demand for fossil fuels in emissions-constraint countries induce a reduction of the fossil fuels world prices and an increase of their consumption in other countries. The term-oftrade channel is related to the competitiveness of trade-exposed and energy intensive industries. The rises of the production costs of regulated producers induces a positive shift of the production of unregulated producers.
Ordinarily the energy-driven channel generates a larger fraction of the total leakage than the terms-of-trade channel. But competitiveness issues are an important political issue. This explains its disproportionate role in the design of emission trading schemes (see Hood, 2010 , for a review of how existing or forthcoming schemes in Australia, California, Europe, New Zealand ... are inuenced by competitiveness issues). This paper focuses on the terms-of-trade channel. Two main approaches have been commonly used to quantify the associated form of leakage. One approach consists in assuming that home and foreign products are imperfect substitutes (e.g. Fischer and Fox, 2012) ; the other one is built on imperfect competition à la Cournot (e.g. Babiker, 2005; Ponssard and Walker, 2008; or monopolistic competition (e.g. Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). The underlying explanation for intra-industry trade in these approaches is in line with the main body of the literature on international trade. Usually, intra-industry trade is explained by imperfect substitutability between home and foreign production, economies of scale and imperfect competition (Krugman, 1979 (Krugman, , 1980 Brander, 1981) .
We introduce a dierent rationale for intra-industry trade. We do consider a homogeneous product and Cournot competition but the existence of interlocking international oligopolies and national strategic trade barriers limit the pressure of international competition. International trade is due to regional capacity constraints and intra-rm ows. For conceptual simplicity, and analytical tractability, the design of our model eliminates the other forms of trade (imperfect substitutability and Cournot competition between national rms).
3 Several other channels have been identied: the diusion of new green technologies can induce a negative leakage (Golombek and Hoel, 2004; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007) , subsequent changes of wealth can induce a positive or negative leakage (Elliott and Fullerton, 2013) , and the change of the marginal environmental damage modies the optimal emissions in other countries (see for instance the work on environmental coalitions by Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994) . The motivation for our framework comes from the empirical literature on leakage for some specic trade-exposed and energy intensive industries.
In Hourcade et al. (2008) (see chapter 3 entitled Deep-dive study: the EU cement and steel sectors) the authors investigate the reasons for the recent peak of imports observed in Europe in 2007. They strongly discount that this peak may come from an increase in international competition. International price comparisons exhibit a low correlation coecient suggesting loosely connected regional markets at the world level. Their explanation relies on the world concentration in these markets and on the regional disequilibria between supply and demand. For cement, they show that non EU imports clearly responded to capacity constraints (the typical case being Spain). The imports came from various and changing sources, and not from dedicated foreign capacities. These factual observations have been embedded in some applied numerical studies. For instance Demailly and Quirion (2008) The electricity sector provides another empirical context in which our framework may be relevant. It is a clear example in which demand is uncertain and short term capacity constraints play a major role in the selection of the optimal technology mix. Regional ows are signicant and come from regional imbalances between supply and demand. It is also a sector in which there are interlocking regional oligopolies. Finally the development of regional ETS schemes makes leakage issues important for the economic analysis of these schemes. Bushnell and Chen (2012) discuss leakage for the Californian electricity sector. In their model, capacity constraints are introduced through a quadratic production function.
The objective in the present paper is to analyze the carbon leakage associated with this specic form of international or regional trade. We identify and explore the consequences of a unilateral change in a climate policy in an analytic model which allows the distinction between short term (without capacity adaptation) versus long term (with capacity adaptation) eects. In an empirical analysis the consequences of this assumption relative to the other forms of trade would naturally need be weighted.
3 The model
Assumptions
The model is kept simple for analytical tractability. Extensions are discussed in the concluding section. Let us consider the market for a homogeneous good. The total quantity produced is denoted q. The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear and random : p(q, θ) = a+λθ−bq, in which a and b are two positive parameters. Uncertainty is introduced through the dimensionless random variable θ which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval: [−1, +1] with density 1/2 and the parameter λ (in e per unit)
which measures the range of demand variations, the case of no uncertainty corresponds to λ = 0. This parameter or the ratio λ/a (dimensionless) will be referred to as demand variability.
The good is produced by an oligopoly consisting of n identical rms.
Each rm has access to two technologies: a home one and a foreign one. To produce with the home technology the rm should rst invest in capacity. In the short-term the rm cannot produce more than its capacity at home but it can import.
The (annualized) cost of a unit of capacity is c k (in e/unit). With a unit of capacity the rm can produce at most one unit of the good for a variable cost c h (in e/unit). The variable cost includes the impact of the CO 2 regulation.
The cost function for the foreign technology involves a linear production cost and no investment cost. The marginal cost of imports is denoted c f (in e/unit).
The production cost should be interpreted as an average delivered cost to the home market from foreign plants that have excess capacity relative to their own home markets. Assuming that the home market is small relative to the foreign market explains that there is no capacity constraint for imports.
It is explicitly assumed that producers control all imports to their home market. As discussed in Section 2 this assumption may be more or less realistic depending on the sector under analysis.
Three assumptions are made on the parameters values. In case of no uncertainty the home technology would be preferred to the foreign one, c k + c h < c f and the demand would be high enough to make production worthwhile, a > c h + c k . Furthermore, the range of demand variations is limited so that in all demand states, in the short term, it is worth producing with the home technology: 0 ≤ λ ≤ a − c h .
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The decision process takes place in two steps. First, each rm decides its home capacity. Second, for each value of θ each rm chooses its home production and its imports (capacities are xed). Firms compete in quantities, à la Cournot. Total capacity is denoted k, total home production is denoted q h and imports q f . To alleviate notations we do not index rms individual production and capacity. All equilibriums are symmetric.
We consider open-loop Nash equilibrium; when rms invest they do not take into account the strategic eects of their investment on the production of their rivals. These strategic eects would obscure the core mechanism at stake. Furthermore, the only symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game is the open-loop one.
We want to study the inuence of the demand variability λ and the CO 2 price through the variable cost c h on the equilibrium total capacity to be denoted k * n (λ, c h ) or simply k * n .
Equilibrium investments
For ease of exposition, we present the case of a monopoly, the oligopoly situation is described in Appendix ). The monopoly long term prot π(k) for a given capacity choice k is given by:
The integrand represents the rm's short-term prot once k has been chosen. The probability that a state occurs is 1/2 dθ, θ being uniformly distributed over [−1, 1] . In each state θ, the rm selects q h and q f to maximize its short-term prot pq − c h q h − c f q f with q = q h + q f and subject to q h ≤ k.
In the short-term, three situations can occur depending on the level of the demand. In low demand states, the rm has excess capacity and produces the monopoly unconstrained quantity (q h = (a+θ−c h )/2) without importing (q f = 0). For intermediate levels of the demand, the rm produces at full capacity (q h = k) and does not import (q f = 0). Finally, when demand is large the rm produces at full capacity and imports. The overall quantity produced is then determined by the cost of imports (q = (a + θ − c f )/2).
The occurrence of these situations depends on the amplitude of demand variation and the level of capacity chosen by the rm. If demand variability is suciently large all three situations arise in equilibrium. 7 hal-00347650, version 2 -17 Apr 2013
In the long term, the rm chooses k to maximizes its prot (1). The rm should equalize the marginal cost of a capacity with the expected short term marginal prot which is the shadow price of the capacity constraint (i.e. q h ≤ k). This ow of revenue is constituted of two integrals: the rst one is the integral of the dierence p + p k − c h obtained when the capacity sets the price in intermediate demand situations; the second term is the integral of c f − c h the short term cost reduction when demand is large and the rm imports.
Lemma 1 If demand variability is suciently large, the equilibrium capacity of the industry is:
And, there are two thresholds θ − and θ
The proof is in Appendix B.
Results
In this section the consequences of an environmental policy such as the introduction of a CO 2 emissions tax, which would consists in an increase of the home variable cost c h are analyzed. We consider the eect of such a policy on: the home investment, the leakage rate and the pass-through rate. We obtain analytical results and provide a numerical illustration of each point.
The specications of the illustration are detailed in Appendix A.
Home investments
Let us rst consider how home capacity is inuenced by an increase of the home variable cost, and how the amplitude of this change is aected by demand variability. Proposition 1
• The optimal capacity decreases with respect to the CO 2 price,
• this eect is larger the larger the demand variability λ:
The proof is in C.1.
An increase of the CO 2 price does, indeed, reduce investment and production in the regulated country. More interestingly, this eect is larger the larger the variability of home demand.
The role of demand variability could be understood by considering the equilibrium rst-order condition. The equilibrium capacity is such that the expected marginal revenue from a capacity is equal to the complete cost c h + c k . The reduction of the capacity induced by the change of the variable cost ensures that this relation holds. With no demand uncertainty (λ = 0), the capacity is equal to the production and determines the price in all demand states. However, when demand varies the capacity sets the price less frequently. Therefore, a larger adjustment of the capacity is necessary to maintain the equilibrium relationship between the marginal revenue and the long-term cost.
The implication of this proposition is that a model that does not account for demand uncertainty will underestimate the eect of the CO 2 regulation on investment, and the larger the variability is the larger the mistake will be.
Numerical illustration
This result is illustrated on Figure 1 . With our calibration, as the CO 2 price increases from zero up to 40e/t the optimal capacity drops by 12%. This may be compared to a 6% drop in case of no uncertainty. This can be understood by considering how the optimal capacity depends on one side on the CO 2 price for a given value of variability at 15% ( Figure   4a ) and on the other side on variability for a given value of the CO 2 price taken at 40e/t (Figure 4b ). 
Leakage
Let us discuss the eect of the implementation of a carbon policy on the leakage rate. We consider the value of this indicator in the short and long 10 hal-00347650, version 2 -17 Apr 2013
term. We consider that in the short term the capacity is xed at k * n (λ, c h )
and that in the long term this capacity varies according to the carbon policy to become k * n (λ, c h + ∆c h ).
To precisely describe the various indicators we need to introduce some notations. Let us denote q h (k, c h , θ) and q f (k, c h , θ) the short term production of an oligopoly of n rms in which each rm has a capacity k/n. The expressions of these quantities are given by (15) in Appendix C1.
The leakage is the increase of foreign emissions that follows the implementation of a carbon policy. The leakage rate is the ratio between the rise of emissions abroad and the decrease of home emissions. If foreign production and home production have the same emission rate, the short term leakage rate is:
And the long term leakage rate is:
Proposition 2
• The short term leakage rate is null.
• The long term leakage rate is increasing with respect to the level of demand variability. It is independent of the market structure.
The proof is in C.2. We also dened observed short term and long term leakage rates. The observed rates are the rates in a particular state θ. The formal denition of these indicators is similar to (4) and, (5) without the expectation operator. Note that the short term and long term rates L ST and L LT are the ratio of the expected changes of productions and not the expectation of the observed rates, which, in our sense, does not have a sensible economic interpretation. We do not formally analyzed the observed indicators but they are computed for the numerical simulations below.
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Numerical illustration
In the short term imports are determined by the capacity constraint, there is no leakage. In the long term, capacity is reduced taking into consideration demand variations and the CO 2 price. Ex post the rm decides to import or not for each demand realization given the new capacity. The situation is depicted in Figure 3(a) . Suppose the observed demand corresponds to θ = .2.
The consumption with the zero CO 2 price corresponds to point A; with the 40e/t CO 2 price it is at B; the level of imports corresponds to the segment BC. The observed leakage rate corresponds to the ratio BC/AC = 28%. A sensitivity analysis of the long term leakage rate with respect to the CO 2 price and the demand variability is made. The results are given in 
Pass-through
The impact of the carbon price on the output price is measured by the pass through rate. This is the ratio between the output price change and the cost change. We follow the same methodology as for the leakage rate. The short term pass through rate is:
and the long term one:
Without uncertainty, the model corresponds to a standard Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal cost, there is no imports and production equals capacity. In this caseto be referred as the standard Cournot model the short term pass through rate is null and the long term one is n/(n + 1).
Proposition 3
• The short term pass through rate is increasing with respect to demand variability and smaller than the long-term pass-through rate.
• The long term pass through rate is equal to the one obtained in the standard Cournot model (it is n/(n + 1).)
The proof is in C.3.
We also dene the observed pass through rate for each value of θ. They are computed in the short term (with unchanged capacity) and in the long term (with adjusted capacity). The expressions of these rates are similar to (6) and (7) without the expectation operator.
4 All these indicators are discussed in the numerical illustration below.
Numerical Illustration
The output price and the observed pass through rates, both short term and long term, are depicted in Figure 4 . Three zones emerge depending on the value of θ. We denote by θ + (40), θ − (40), θ + (0) and θ − (0) the values of the thresholds states of Lemma 1 for a CO 2 price of 40e/tCO 2 and 0e/ tCO 2 respectively; θ h is the demand state in which the capacity constraint start being binding for a price of 40e/ tCO 2 and a capacity not adapted.
Firstly, for θ < θ − (40), capacity is not a constraint. The eect of the CO 2 price on the short and long term rates is similar, the pass through in these states is n/(n + 1) as in a standard Cournot model. Secondly, for 1 ≥ θ > θ + (0), the price is set by the import cost and the pass through is null. In both cases there is no dierence between short term and long term.
What happens in the median zone can be inferred from the graphs in Figure 4 . The prices depicted in Figure 4a correspond to
• abcd for CO 2 = 0e/t,
• ehcd (CO 2 = 40e/t) in the short term,
• efgcd (CO 2 = 40e/t) in the long term.
The pass through rates are depicted in Figure 4 (b). The short term pass through rate is 52% and the long term one is 86%=n/(n+1)=6/7. The observed pass through rates in each demand state are also depicted. The observed short term pass through rate remains at 6/7 until θ − (0) and then 4 Contrary to the leakage rate the short term (resp. long term) pass through rate is the expectation of the observed short term (resp. long term) pass through rate because the denominator (the change of the CO 2 price) is constant across demand states.
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progressively decreases to zero at θ h (θ h = 0.4 in the numerical illustration)
and then remains at zero.
The observed long term pass through rate increases from 6/7 for θ − (40) < θ < θ + (40). It remains constant for θ + (40) < θ < θ − (0). It decreases to zero for θ − (0) < θ < θ + (0). The peak can be computed to be at 171%, which is well above 100%! It occurs because the adapted capacity creates a constraint while there was none without the CO 2 price increase.
The introduction of demand variations has a major impact on the pass through rates. The observed pass through rates, both the short term and the long term rates, depart from the one in a standard Cournot model. In particular they will be lower in high demand states such as the period corresponding to the rst EU-ETS (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . The average short term pass through rate is 52% which is much lower than in a standard Cournot model
i.e. 6/7=86%. A sensitivity analysis of the short term pass through rate with respect to the CO 2 price and demand variability is made. The results are given in Table   3 . It is slightly increasing in both dimensions, from 49% to 57%. Recall that the standard Cournot rate is 6/7 = 86%, which is much higher.
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Conclusion
In some energy intensive industries it has been empirically observed that competition is dominated by multinationals which optimize their current production through their international network of plants. To meet the regional demand at home, home plants are used in priority to imports, unless the capacity of these plants is saturated. As a consequence imports only occur in high demand states at home. We formalize such a context and show how in the long term capacities are adjusted to a unilateral change in the CO 2 price at home. The induced leakage and pass through rates are derived both in the short term (without capacity adjustments) and in the long term (with capacities adjustments). We show that the leakage rates and the pass through rates are higher in the long term than in the short term.
The channel of carbon leakage explored in this paper had not been formally identied so far. While our results are purely conceptual we think they may be relevant in a number of empirical situations.
Our qualitative results on short term and long term eects seem to be in line with the comments reported in Ellerman et al. (2010) Another context for application could concern the electricity sector, a sector with strong capacity constraint and large demand variability. Though international trade is low, regional trade is not. The development if unilateral regional trading scheme in California did put the leakage issue for electricity on the policy agenda (Hood, 2010) . Bushnell and Chen (2012) 
Appendix A The numerical illustration
The data corresponding to the numerical illustration is given in Table 1 . This data is illustrative of the EU cement industry and originates from Ponssard and Walker (2008) . The demand function is calibrated such that at the Cournot equilibrium with 6 rms without uncertainty, each rm produces 1 Mt, the market price is 100e/t and the price elasticity at the equilibrium is -0.27.
The demand uctuations captured through the parameter λ/a corresponds to the average demand uctuations of a European country over the last 20 years. The variable costs in e per ton of cement are: for investment c k = 15 (annualized over a 40 years life duration for a plant), for home production c h = 25, for import c f = 75 (involving sea transport, terminal cost and further inland transportation by road; it is suggestive of an inland region). We consider the implementation of a CO 2 price of 40e/tCO 2 and an emission rate of .65 tCO 2 per ton of cement, so ∆c h = 25. 
The monopoly capacity
The monopoly long term prot is a strictly concave function of k ∈ [0, (a + λ − c h )/2b. There is a unique prot maximizing capacity k * that solves the rst order condition:
Four situations can arise whether at k * : θ − = −1 or not and θ + = 1 or not. The level of demand variability and the cost parameters determine in which situation we are. We limit ourselves to the case in which the demand 21 variability is suciently large so that θ − > −1 and θ + < 1 (the expressions in the other situations could be obtained by request to the authors).
In that case, a + λθ − − 2bk = c h , and a + λθ + = c f . Equation (10) is:
Therefore, the two thresholds satisfy the equations:
Replacing θ + in (14) by its expression (9) gives:
The thresholds are indeed respectively higher than -1 and lower than 1 if and only if λ is suciently large:
The oligopoly capacity A sketch of the proof is provided, a more detailed one can be obtained by request to the authors.
Assume that there are n rms. Each rm simultaneously chooses its capacity and a production plan. At an equilibrium: on the short term, in each demand state rms play a constrained Cournot game with two technologies available, and, in the long term, each rm capacity is a solution of a rst order equation that equalizes the capacity cost c k with expected short term marginal prot. Any equilibrium is symmetric because the expected marginal short term prot of two rms is equal if and only if their capacities are equal. Then the only possible equilibrium is symmetric and the aggregate equilibrium capacity k * n is the unique solution of equation:
where θ − (n, k) and θ + (n, k) are :
and aggregate equilibrium productions q h (k, c h , n, θ) and q f (k, c h , n, θ) are the constrained Cournot one:
By injecting expressions (17) and (18) (14), and the oligopoly capacity is
And nally, the solution of equation (16) and the corresponding productions (19) are equilibrium strategies because individual prot of each rm is concave and rst order conditions are satised.
C Results

C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We use the expression established in Lemma 1. The derivatives of k * n in equation (2) 
The short-term leakage rate is null because Q f does not depend on c h , so the numerator of (4) is null.
The long term leakage is independent of n because both the numerator and the denominator are proportional to n/(n+1) (remember that θ − and θ + are independent of n at equilibrium and that k n * is proportional to n/(n+1)).
To determine the eect of λ on the leakage rate, we write the long-term leakage rate as
From equations (21) and (22), the two derivatives of expected quantities are:
∂Q f ∂c h = −0.5(1 − θ + ) ∂k * n ∂c h
− ∂Q h ∂c h = 0.5 n n + 1
Let us prove that the former is increasing and the latter decreasing w.r.t. λ, this will prove that the long-term leakage rate is increasing with respect to λ:
• From Proposition 1 the derivative of k * n is decreasing w.r.t. λ, and from the equations (14) the equilibrium threshold θ + is decreasing so ∂ 2 Q f ∂λ∂c h > 0.
• Next, using the expression ( and θ − is increasing w.r.t. λ, the ratio (1 − θ − )/(θ + − θ − ) is larger than 1 and decreasing w.r.t. λ (from Equation (20) and Proposition 1) so − ∂ 2 Q h ∂λ∂c h < 0
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We rst proove the result relative to the long-term pass-through rate. We consider the derivative of the expected price denoted Ep with respect to c h .
The total derivative is composed of two components a direct one and an indirect one:
With the expression (19) for home production, the rst term is ∂Ep/∂c h = 0.5 (θ − + 1) n/(n + 1). The second term is related to the change of capacity. A marginal change of capacity increases expected price of ∂Ep/∂k = (θ + − θ − ) b/2, and using (20):
Therefore, the long-term pass-through rate is P T LT = 1 ∆c h ∆c h 0 dEp dc h dc h = n n + 1 (26) Concerning, the short-term pass-through rate. It could be written
• It is smaller than the long-term one because the second term of (??) is positive; so it is less than n/(n + 1);
• The derivative of the price ∂Ep/∂c h is 0.5(1 + θ − )n/(n + 1), and θ − is increasing with respect to λ (cf equation (8)) so ∂Ep/∂c h is increasing w.r.t. λ and so is the short-term pass-through rate.
